The use of conventional classical logic is misleading for characterizing the behavior of logic programs because a logic program, when queried, will do one of three things: succeed with the query, fail with it, or not respond because it has fallen into infinite backtracking. In [7] Kleene proposed a three-valued logic for use in recursive function theory. The so-called third truth value was really undefined: truth value not determined. This logic is a useful tool in logic-program specification, and in particular, for describing models. (See [11].) Tarski showed that formal languages, like arithmetic, cannot contain their own truth predicate because one could then construct a paradoxical sentence that effectively asserts its own falsehood. Natural languages do allow the use of "is true", so by Tarski's argument a semantics for natural language must leave truth-value gaps: some sentences must fail to have a truth value. In [8] Kripke showed how a model having truth-value gaps, using Kleene's three-valued logic, could be specified. The mechanism he used is a famiUar one in program semantics: consider the least fixed point of a certain monotone operator. But that operator must be defined on a space involving three-valued logic, and for Kripke's application it will not be continuous.
clearly differentiate between programs that "behave" the same but that we "feel" are different.
Finally, we show the result is far too powerful. We can now write logic programs semantically characterizing the 11} relations, not just the recursively enumerable ones. Thus semantic behavior is not generally machine realizable. We take this as an argument for imposing restrictions on logic programs, to weed out the "too powerful" ones. Tables for the other connectives can be easily constructed (see [7] ). But we prefer a somewhat different approach.
SATURATED SETS
Rather than working with truth functions, Hintikka and others have popularized the use of sets of statements, model sets. Being in the set corresponds to being true; being out, to false. We extend this to the three-valued case by using SmuUyan's device of prefixed formulas [13] . In effect we treat both known-to-be-true and known-to-be-false as positive information, and undefined as absence of information. What follows is essentially taken from [6] . We introduce two new symbols, T and F. If X is a formula, TX and FX are signed formulas. If 5' is a set of signed statements, we informally think about it in the following way. TX e 5 means S says X is true. FX e S means S says X is false. If neither TX G S nor FX & S, S says nothing about the truth value of X, or X has truth value u. Of course we do not want both TX and FX in S then. We introduce the following terminology.
Definitions. Let 5 be a set of signed statements.
(1) S is downward saturated if 
(d) FXy y e S =» FX& S and FY^S, (e) T^XeS
=» FXeS, (f) F^XeS => TXeS, (g) T{Vx)P(x) e 5 =» TP{t) e 5 for every closed term t, (h) F(^x)P{x) e S => FP{t) e S for some closed term t, (i) T{3x)P(x) G 5 => TP{t) G S for some closed term t, (j) F(3x)P<x) e 5 => FP{t) G S for every closed term t. (6) S is complete if either TA' or f Z is in S for every statement X (7) S is atomically complete if either TA or i^^ is in S for every atomic statement A.
F^X&S, (g) TTCO G 5 for every closed term t => T{\/x)P{x) G S, (h) FPit)eS for some closed term t => Fl\/x)P(x)e S, (i) ri'CO G S for some closed term t => T(3x)P(x) e S, (j) FPCO G 5 for every closed term t => F(3x)P(x)
(8) S is a moc?e/ set if S is saturated, consistent and complete.
Saturated, consistent sets correspond exactly to valuations in Kleene's three-valued logic, in the following sense. Suppose 5 is a saturated, consistent set of signed Statements. Define a map v from statements to (t,f,u} as follows. ft if TXeS, v{X)=lf if FX^S, \ u otherwise, j; is a valuation in the Kleene three valued sense. Conversely, if we start with such a valuation v, we can easily construct the corresponding saturated, consistent set S. In the rest of this paper we will work exclusively with saturated, consistent sets, rather than with three-valued mappings.
Note that adding a completeness requirement, that is, restricting consideration to model sets, gives us the classical two-valued mappings. 
LOGIC PROGRAMS-SYNTAX
We will only consider clauses with a single atomic formula in the conclusion, but we wish to allow arbitrary propositional connectives in the hypothesis. Accordingly we define clause somewhat differently than usual. We assume the language L has some fixed set of function, constant, and relation symbols, and formulas of L are defined in the usual way. Recall we take A, V, -,, V, and 3 as primitive. We also assume that = is a relation symbol of L, though we do not allow its use in logic programs. Rather, like quantifiers, it comes up in their analysis. A is the conclusion and { fij,..., 5") is the premise of this clause.
SEMANTICS
We define the notion of a three-valued model (or better, a partial model) for a finite logic program (or better, for the IFF formula associated with it). Such a model will be a consistent set of signed atomic statements of L.
Definition. Let S be a consistent set of signed atomic statements of L. Since a consistent set of signed atomic statements S need not be complete, S need not make every statement true or false. On the other hand, since members of S are signed atomic statements, S is trivially downward saturated, hence 5'^ is both saturated and consistent, by Propositions 3.3 and 3.4.
The equality relation plays a somewhat special role, so we give it a special treatment.
Definition. By a full set we mean a consistent set 5 of signed atomic statements of L such that, for closed terms t and M, if ^ = M then T(t = u) e^ S, and ii t^u then F(t = u)^ S. By A basic set we mean a consistent set of signed atomic statements not involving = .
It is trivial that any basic set S can be extended to a unique full set. We call it the full set associated with S. In giving examples, we usually present a basic set that can be extended to a full set, rather than specifying the fuU set in detail.
The connective = can be defined in the usual ways; for example, X= Y means -,(X A-,Y)A-,{Y A-iX). But it is not strong enough for our purposes. For instance, if 5 is a consistent set of signed atomic statements, S will make P = P neither true nor false if S assigns no truth value to P itself. We introduce a connective = , also from Kleene, which we only use in a restricted way. s is a connective whose behavior cannot be defined from those introduced so far. Intuitively, AT s y is to mean X and Y have the same truth value from the set {t,f,u}. 
is denoted D(P).
Finally, the main notion of this section.
Definition. A full set S is a partial model for logic program P provided S satisfies D(P).
A basic set S is a partial model for P provided the full set associated with 5 is a partial model for P.
Convention. In giving examples in this and later sections, we assume the language L has the constant, function and relation symbols that actually occur in the program under consideration, and no others. This is not necessary, but it is convenient. Of course, when discussing the behavior of a program we may move to a larger language involving = . It will be clear when this happens.
Example. Let P be the program even( a) <-
Let S be the full set associated with (reven(a),
5 is a partial model for P. That is, S satisfies D{P). We check one case; consider the closed instance of D{P):
Since s(a) and a are different terms, F{s{a) = a)e S Q S". If / is any closed term other than a, then s(a) and s(t) are different; hence F{s(a) = s(ty)E: S, and hence by upward closure, F(.y(a) = 5(?) A-,even(0)e S^. And if t is a, then
As another example, this time let P be the program even(a)<-
Teven(s(s{a))),...}.
MONOTONE MAPPINGS
We want to associate partial models for logic programs with fixed points of operators. Now the intersection of any family of consistent sets of signed statements is again a consistent set of signed statements, but the same is not true for union. We do have that the union of a chain, and more generally, of a directed family of consistent sets is a consistent set. This means we do not have a complete lattice, but a weaker structure, called a complete semilattice here. In a complete lattice, [14] guarantees that every monotone function has a smallest and a greatest fixed point, and the collection of its fixed points itself constitutes a complete lattice. In a complete semilattice things are a httle more compUcated. A monotone function always has a smallest fixed point, though it may not have a greatest, but several maximal ones instead. Among fixed points certain intrinsic or optimal ones are singled out (definition below). There is a smallest and a greatest intrinsic fixed point, and the intrinsic fixed points constitute a complete lattice.
Interest in the fixed-point structure of monotone maps on complete semilattices was clearly rather broad in the mid 70s. [8] presented the essential facts (without proof) and applied them to philosophical problems. [9] state and prove the same results, in different terminology, and apply them to issues in computer science. See also [10] . We use Kripke's term intrinsic rather than Manna and Shamir's optimal. And we present proofs of what we need, based on the proofs in [6] .
Definition. (C, < > is a complete semilattice if (1) C is partially ordered by < , (2) every nonempty subset D of C has an inf, denoted flD (in particular, C has a smallest member), We show E has a smallest member and it is a fixed point of 0. Since every fixed point of O above ^4 is in E, this will estabUsh part (2).
Let X e E. Then A < X, (!>(A)<^iX), and so.4 < ^(X). Further, (^(X)<X, so 4>($(Jir))< $(A'). It follows that $ ( Z ) e E; E is closed under 0.
By part (1) E is not empty. Hence HE e C. Certainly A <CW-. Let Y e E. Then DE < y, SO a>(nE) < 0 ( 7 ) < Y. since Y was arbitrary, a>(nE) < (IE; HE e E. Then since E is closed under $, ^(fW) e E, so (IE < $((1E). The conclusion now follows easily.
(3): Suppose ^(B) < B. Lct¥ = {Xe:C\X < B and X<(^{X)}. Since C has a smallest member, F is not empty. And it is easy to check that F is closed under 0.
F has an upper bound, B; hence by Lemma 6.1, UF G C. TriviaUy \JF <B. Suppose A ' e F . Then ^< $ ( X ) < 0(UF). Hence UF<$(UF). We have U F e F . Since F is closed under 4», 0(UF) e F, so $(UF) < UF. Thus F contains the fixed point UF. Since every fixed point below B is in F, UF must be the largest such. D NOTE. Since a complete semilattice C must contain a smallest member, (1) and (2) above guarantee the existence of a smallest and a maximal fixed point. There need not be a largest member of C, so we cannot use (3) to conclude the existence of a largest fixed point. The following proposition is as close as we can come. (2): Choose M e M. Then (IM < M, so 0(nM) < 0 ( Af) = M. Thus $(nM) < fW. By Proposition 6.2, part (3), 0 has a largest fixed point below CM, which is the largest intrinsic fixed point by part (1) . (3): Suppose A <<^{A) and A < CM. As shown in the proof of part (2), 0((nM) < fWL. Then Proposition 6.2, part (2)(b), says the smallest fixed point of $ above A will be below DM, and hence intrinsic by part (1) . (4): Let (/, < > be the family of intrinsic fixed points of 0, ordered by the ordering relation of (C, < ) restricted to I. Note that 0 and U are defined in terms of < and so do not necessarily have the same meaning in (I, < ) as in (C, < ).
We show every nonempty subset of I has a least upper bound in (I, < ). Let D c I be nonempty. It must be shown that there is in <C, < ) a smallest intrinsic fixed point above all members of D.
The argument in this paragraph takes place in (C, < >. Since every member of D is intrinsic, by part (2) D has an upper bound, and hence by Lemma 6.1 a least upper bound t b e C. It is easy to show that UD < $(UD) and UD < flM. Also $ ( n M ) < n M . Then Proposition 6.2, part (2)(b), says $ has a smallest fixed point, D, in C above UD and which will be below DM, and hence intrinsic. Then D must be the smallest intrinsic fixed point above all the members of D. D Finally we discuss the notion of approximating to fixed points.
Proposition 6.4. Let (C, <) be a complete semilattice and $ be monotone.
(1) Suppose S < $ ( S ) .
(a) The following defines a sequence of members <^ 1 "(S) of C for each
ordinal a:
for limit ordinals X, 0 T ^(S) = U * T " ( 5 ) .
a<\ (6) The sequence 0 t "(S) increases with a and converges to the smallest fixed point of $ above S.
(2) Suppose ^{S)<S.
(a) The following defines a sequence of members 0 i "(5) of C:
$i"+H"S') = $(4>j,"(s)), for limit ordinals X, 0 i ^(S) = 0^1 "(S). (b) The sequence $ i °(S) decreases as a increases and converges to the largest fixed point of $ below S.
PROOF. Omitted. D Say J. is the smallest member of C. Trivially ± < $ ( J.), so by (1) the sequence $ t "(-L) converges to the smallest fixed point of $. The least ordinal a for which 0 t "(-L) is the least fixed point of $ is called the closure ordinal of $.
Again, say M is the family of maximal fixed points of $ . HM need not be a fixed point (see Example IV in Section 8). But $(nM) < flM, so by Proposition 6.3, part (1), the sequence $ i "(DM) converges to the largest intrinsic fixed point of $.
OPERATORS ASSOCIATED WITH PROGRAMS
Let A be the collection of all basic sets. Then (A, c ) is a partial ordering. And it is easy to check that we have closure under infs, but not under sups, only xmder sups of directed sets. Thus (A, c ) is a complete semilattice.
If P is a logic program, we let P* be the program consisting of all clauses C6 where C ^ P, 6 is a. substitution, and C6 is a statement (has no free variables). In general P * will be infinite even if P is not. Now, let P be a finite logic program; we associate with it an operator $^: A ^ A as follows. Let 5 e A. For an atomic statement A of L (not involving =), TA G Op(5) provided some clause in /** has conclusion A and a premise that S makes true;
FA G <tp{S) provided every clause in P* having conclusion A has a premise that S' makes false.
If we had both TA, FA G ^p(S), then there would be some clause in P* whose premise 5 would make both true and false. If C is the conjunction of that premise, r C G 5^ and FC ^S^, so by Proposition 3.4, S would not have been atomically consistent. It follows that <^p maps members of A to members of A.
Lemma 7.1. Let S^ and Sj be sets of signed atomic statements, and let X be a statement. If Si makes X true {false) and S-^'^Sj, then Sj makes X true (false).

PROOF. Immediate from Proposition 3.2. D
It follows that for a logic program P, the operator Op is monotone, and hence the results in Section 6 apply. Feven(s(a)), feven(i^(a) ),...}. Obviously both are maximal in A, so it follows by Proposition 6.3, part (1) , that the largest intrinsic fixed point of Op is also its least fixed point.
Proposition 7.2. Let P be a finite logic program. S is a fixed point of Op if and only if
S is a partial model for P.
PROOF. Straightforward, and omitted here. D
In [1] monotone operators of a different kind were associated with a narrower class of logic programs than we are considering here. We look at the relationship between the two kinds of operators on this class of programs. Tp is monotone on (B, c ), where B is the collection of all sets of atomic statements, a complete lattice. Another definition from [1] . Let T be the operator associated with program P. Then
T t " = TT"(0),
Ti" = Tr(f/),
where U is the set of all atomic statements, the top of (B, c >, as 0 is its bottom. 
Proposition 7.3. For a logic program P made up of definite clauses, for all ordinals a,
( l ) T T " = {>l|r>leOpt"(0)},
EXAMPLES AND ANALOGIES
We give several simple logic programs that are useful for explicating the various fixpoint notions introduced earlier. The program examples are closely related to examples of statements given by Kripke to help illustrate the machinery of his theory of truth. We point out resemblances as we go along.
Example I. Let P be the program
R{a)^R{a),
and let $p be the associated operator. Both {TR{a)] and {FR(a)] are maximal fixed points of <S>p. It follows by Proposition 6.3, part (1) , that the only intrinsic fixed point of Op is 0 , which is also the smallest fixed point. The Kripke analog to this is the following statement (or rather, its formalized coimterpart):
R: Statement R is true. In Kripke's theory some fixed points make statement R true, some make it false, so it has no truth value in the least fixed point of Kripke's operator. Since 5 is a fixed point, FR(a) ^S. But since members of the domain of Op are consistent sets of signed atomic statements, this is impossible. Hence TR(a)€S. By a similar argument FR(a)€S. Thus R(a) is given a truth value in no fixed point for $;>; the only fixed point is 0 .
Example II. This time let P be the program
R{a) *--,R{a).
Let 5 be a fixed point of $p. If TR(a)eS then F--,R(a)eS" and hence FR(a)G<Pp(S).
The Kripke analog now is the following statement: R: Statement R is false.
Notice the essential difi"erence between Examples I and II. In both cases R(a) receives no truth value in the least fixed point. But in I it is because either value is possible (in extensions of the least fixed point), while in II, neither value is possible.
Example III. Let P be the program
R(a)*-Ria)w^Ria).
The least fixed point of $p is easily seen to be 0 ; hence in it, Ria) receives no truth value. On the other hand, if M is a maximal fixed point, it will assign R(a) a. truth value; hence M will make R{a)V-,R{a) true, and hence TR{a)e^p(M) = M. Thus {TR(a)} is the only maximal fixed point, which is thus the largest intrinsic fixed point.
The Kripke analog is the following: R: Statement R is either true or false. Example IV. Let P be the following program:
Q(a)*-R(a)y^Ria), R(a)<^R(a).
The least fixed point of 0^, once again, is 0 . Both {TQ{a), TR(a)} and {TQ(a), FR{a)} are maximal fixed points. And it is easy to see that if M is any maximal fixed point, either TR{a)GM or FR{a)GM, and hence in any case TQ(a) e M. Thus, if M is the family of maximal fixed points, DM = {TQ(a)}.
On the other hand, if / is the largest (or any) intrinsic fixed point, / c HM by Proposition 6.3, part (1) . Then / can assign no truth value to Ria). It follows that $p(/) (that is, / ) assigns no truth value to Qia). Thus 7 = 0 and we have an example in which the largest intrinsic fixed point / is strictly below DM.
The Kripke analog is the following pair of statements: Q: Statement R is either true or false. R: Statement R is true. In Kripke's terms, Q is a statement that is true in every fixed point in which it has a truth value, yet it has no intrinsic truth value.
The reader may enjoy determining the fixpoint structure of the operators associated with the following programs.
Example VI.
Q{a)^R{a)v^R{a), R{a)^^Q{a).
Example VII.
Qia)^-^R(a),
Ria)*-^Q{a).
Example VIII.
Q{a)^R{a)v^R{a), Ria)^Qia)w^Q{a).
Finally, consider the following variation on Example IV; program Pj:
R{a)<^R{a).
We use this to give a simple example of Kleene logic manipulations. As defined in Section 5, a partial model of Pi is any basic set whose associated full set satisfies D(Pi), which is
Definition. Let us call a formula X=Y K-valid if every consistent set of signed atomic statements satisfies X=Y.
The following replacement result is easy to verify. It is done by induction on formula complexity, just as with the replacement theorem for classical logic. (2) Ay{AyB)==AyB.
We give a small portion of the verification, by way of illustration. Suppose, for simpUcity, that A, B, and C have no free variables. Let S be an arbitrary consistent set of signed atomic statements, making the left-hand side of (1) Now, returning to the example. As special cases of (1) and (2), the following are K-vaM:
It follows, using replacement and transitivity, that a full set S satisfies DiP{) if and only if S satisfies
Rix) = x = aAiRia)\J~,Ria)).
That is, S is a partial model for P^ if and only if 5' is a partial model for
R{a)<^Ria)y-yR{a),
the program of Example III. Then, by Proposition 7.2, the operators associated with P^ and the program of Example III have the same fixed points.
Definition. We call two logic programs P^ and Pj equivalent if they have the same partial models.
The logic programs of Examples I and II are not equivalent, though they have the same smallest partial models. As we use it, equivalence requires that all partial models be considered.
When converting one logic program into another using logic manipulations, the possibihty of no response must be taken into account. That is, three-valued logic should be used. The rather trivial example above is sufficient to demonstrate that such arguments are very much like classical ones, and are essentially no harder to carry out. The reader may like to practice by estabUshing the equivalence of the following two logic programs: Qia)^^Ria), Ria)^^Qia) and
Qia)^^Ria), R(a)^Ria).
Finally, we use this notion of equivalence to establish a normal-form theorem.
Definition.
A literal is an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula. 
EXCESS STRENGTH:
In [1] an example is given of a logic program for which the closure ordinal, in their sense, is not w but w + w. The example carries over directly to the present setting. The program is the following:
Q{s{x))^Q{x).
Let $ be the operator associated with this program. It is easily verified that, for a < w,
The least fixed point is $ t "''"(0). This example can be generalized, raising the closure ordinal. The question is, how high can it be pushed? In fact, it follows from [2] that the Umit is Church-Kleene w^, the first nonrecursive ordinal. We sketch an alternate proof that the machinery introduced here allows the semantic characterization of the 11J relations, and thus is much too powerful for computational purposes.
In [12] SmuUyan presented elementary formal systems as a mechanism for defining and proving things about the recursively enumerable relations. Elementary formal systems are essentially notational variants of the definite clauses of Section 7. In [5] the elementary-formal-system machinery was generalized in several directions. In one, arbitrary data structures were allowed, and a connection with search computabihty estabhshed. In another, universal quantifiers were allowed (in premise parts only), creating what were called u elementary formal systems. Connections were established between w elementary formal systems and hyperelementary theory, a generalization of hyperarithmetic theory. In particular, for a data structure of numbers (or of terms that are Godel numberable), it was shown that the relations characterizable by w elementary formal systems are the 11J relations (also see [4] ).
Consequently, to establish our claim here it is enough to show how to elementary formal systems can be translated into logic programs. In fact, all the elementary-formal-system machinery is directly available. What remains is to show how to simulate universal quantifiers, and that is straightforward. The following illustrates how it is done. Consider the program A{x)^^B{x), B{x)^C{x,y),
C{x,y)^^D{x,y).
It is easily verified that, if S is any partial model for this program, S satisfies
Aix)sC^y)D{x,y).
We note that Kripke's theory of truth displayed a similar Church-Kleene Wi phenomenon. See the remarks at the end of [8] .
Let (C, < ) be a complete semilattice. If D c C is directed and 0 is monotone on C, then { $ ( / ) ) I i) G D) is directed. We say 0 is continuous if, for any directed set D, $(UD) = U{$(D) 11> e D). In the case of interest to us here-(A, c > where A is the collection of consistent sets of signed atomic statements-continuity takes on a simple character. For every S e A, ( SQ c 51 SQ is finite) is directed, and S = \J{SQQS\SO is finite}. So, if $ is monotone and continuous, Z e $ ( 5 ) <=> Z e <^(SQ) for some finite SQ C S. Conversely, if a mapping $ meets this condition, it follows that it is monotone and continuous. Finally, such mappings have closure ordinal w.
In more conventional programming languages, only programming constructs whose interpretation is continuous are available. This is simply not the case with the logic-programming machinery considered here. Continuity must be imposed as a separate condition. We propose the following.
Call a logic program P acceptable if ^p is a continuous map. Only acceptable logic programs should be considered acceptable.
We conclude with the following, somewhat vague questions:
What are syntactic criteria for recognizing acceptable programs?
What is the relationship between a program being acceptable and Clark's notion of an allowed querry [3] ?
What useful notions can be developed that are similar to acceptability, but weaker? For example, if P is a program in which negation is not used, the closure ordinal of <^p need not be w, but the problem is with /"-signed statements. TX is in the least fixed point of <^p if and only if TX&f^pt " ( 0 ) . Are there other "semiacceptable" notions like this?
